AWS Account ID Vulnerabilities and Security Risks Identified
/ 4 min read
Quick take - Recent discussions on cloud security have highlighted vulnerabilities in Amazon Web Services (AWS), particularly regarding the exploitation of AWS Account IDs by threat actors, which can lead to unauthorized access to sensitive resources and data if not properly secured.
Fast Facts
- Recent vulnerabilities in Amazon Web Services (AWS) highlight the risks associated with AWS Account IDs, which can be exploited by threat actors to identify IAM roles and users.
- Detailed error messages from AWS can inadvertently reveal the existence of specific IAM users or roles, aiding malicious actors in their attacks.
- Unauthorized access to sensitive data can occur through public Elastic Block Store (EBS) and Relational Database Service (RDS) snapshots if not properly secured, as they can be filtered by AWS Account ID.
- Tools like nmap and Wappalyzer can assist attackers in reconnaissance, revealing active ports and technologies used in AWS-hosted applications.
- Organizations are urged to enhance their security measures, such as enabling S3 data events, to better protect their AWS resources from potential exploits.
AWS Cloud Security Vulnerabilities
In recent discussions surrounding cloud security, a series of vulnerabilities associated with Amazon Web Services (AWS) have come to light, particularly concerning the exploitation of AWS Account IDs by threat actors. This brief consolidates key findings regarding the potential risks and methods of exploitation that have emerged from various reports.
Risks Associated with AWS Account IDs
Threat actors can leverage an AWS Account ID to identify associated Identity and Access Management (IAM) roles and users, raising concerns about the security of cloud-based resources. Detailed error messages generated by AWS services can inadvertently confirm the existence of specific IAM users or roles, thereby providing malicious actors with valuable information for further attacks.
One notable vulnerability is the ability to filter public Elastic Block Store (EBS) and Relational Database Service (RDS) snapshots by the AWS Account ID. This capability allows unauthorized users to access potentially sensitive data if the snapshots are not properly secured. Additionally, the AWS account ID linked to an Amazon S3 bucket emerges as a critical piece of information, as it can facilitate access to the bucket’s contents.
Methods of Exploitation
Initial reconnaissance typically involves the acquisition of a set of AWS credentials and an associated IP address. Tools like nmap can be utilized to conduct port scans, revealing active ports, such as port 80 (HTTP). Moreover, Wappalyzer, a tool for identifying software versions, can help attackers understand the technologies running on the web application hosted on AWS.
Research indicates that it is feasible to brute-force the AWS account ID of a public S3 bucket. A custom script can be employed to create a policy using the S3:ResourceAccount Policy Condition Key, enabling access to an S3 bucket based on its account ID. This script employs string matching and wildcards to reduce the search space for the account ID, enhancing the efficiency of the attack process.
Roles within AWS IAM can be configured to allow specific actions. For instance, an IAM user assuming a role may have permissions for “s3:GetObject ” and “s3:ListBucket ” on a designated S3 bucket. The role’s trust policy permits the user to assume it, which can be exploited if the AWS account ID is known.
Recommendations for Enhanced Security
The AWS Command Line Interface (CLI) command aws configure is often used to set up AWS credentials for executing various commands. The command python3 -m pip install s3-account-search installs a tool designed for searching AWS account IDs. To effectively use this tool, users must have the Amazon Resource Name (ARN) of the role and the target S3 bucket. In this context, the discovered AWS account ID is 107513503799.
Public resources, including EBS and RDS snapshots, can be searched using this account ID, potentially revealing exposed resources that could be exploited. Additionally, the region of the S3 bucket can be determined using cURL to examine response headers, with the “x-amz-bucket-region” header indicating the specific region of the bucket (e.g., us-east-1). Users can log into their AWS management console to search for public snapshots within the specified region.
Although AWS account IDs are typically not regarded as highly sensitive information, knowing an organization’s account ID can assist in conducting security assessments. It is important to note that actions performed to discover the account ID through AWS Security Token Service (STS) are not visible to the bucket owner’s account, further complicating detection efforts.
To enhance security measures, enabling S3 data events can provide additional detection capabilities, although this action may incur additional costs. As cloud security continues to be a pressing concern, organizations are encouraged to reassess their security protocols and ensure that their AWS resources are adequately protected against potential exploits.
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